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Abstract Public policy affects the prevalence and performance of both productive and
high-impact entrepreneurship. High-impact entrepreneurship prospers when knowledge is
successfully generated and exploited in the economy. This process depends on
complementary key actors who use their competencies in what we denote a competence
bloc. Although variations in economic contexts make prescribing a general panacea
impossible, a number of relevant policy areas that affect key actors can be identified. In this
paper this is done in the areas of tax policy and labor market policy. It is shown that high
and/or distortive taxes and heavy labor market regulations impinge on the creation and
functioning of competence blocs, thereby reducing high-impact entrepreneurship.
Keywords entrepreneurship . gazelles . high-growth firms . high-impact entrepreneurship .
innovation . institutions . labor market policy . tax policy
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1 Introduction
Enterprises exhibit great differences in age, size, industry affiliation, growth ambitions and
growth performance. It is well documented that young and small firms contribute
disproportionately to net employment and productivity growth (see van Praag and Versloot
2008 for a survey). Meanwhile, most firms grow very slowly, or not at all. Zook and Allen
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(1999) report that only one in seven companies achieves sustained growth while remaining
profitable. Accordingly, some observers point to a small number of rapidly growing firms
that contribute a disproportionately large share of net job creation and economic growth
(see, e.g., Birch and Medoff 1994; Storey 1994; Schreyer 2000; Acs et al. 2008; and the
survey by Henrekson and Johansson 2010).
The fact that a small share of all firms plays such a disproportionate role in the economy
motivates our emphasis on what Zoltan Acs (2008) has named high-impact entrepreneur-
ship (HIE). Entrepreneurial firms with an exceptional growth trajectory are sometimes
termed high-growth firms (HGFs) or “gazelles” as well. (We will use the terms HIE and
HGF interchangeably throughout the article.) High-impact entrepreneurial activities
commercialize key innovations or create disruptive breakthroughs, extract substantial
entrepreneurial rents, spur growth (in both the firm and the economy) and employment, and
shift the production possibility frontier outwards. In short, HIE significantly influences the
economy. Yet a typical start-up is not characterized by HIE, and HIE is not necessarily
performed within new (or small) companies.1
Policy discussions should take note of these facts. Rather than targeting small firms to
compensate for their inherent disadvantages—a motivation for many policies in the recent
past—focus should be directed towards providing a framework for fostering a dynamic
economy conducive to HIE. What bundle of policies ensures that people can start new
ventures, develop these ventures into high-impact firms, and expand existing ventures to
their full potential?2
The journal article format does not permit an exhaustive treatment of all pertinent
policies. Instead we will focus on two policy areas of crucial importance, namely tax policy
and polices pertaining to the functioning of labor markets. Other areas, such as private
property rights, the functioning of financial markets and the regulation of product markets,
are important but will not be dealt with here.
Yet the entrepreneur is not the only agent that is of consequence for economic progress.
Successful entrepreneurs who identify and exploit new ideas—thereby creating and
expanding businesses—depend on a number of complementary agents, such as skilled
labor, industrialists, venture capitalists and secondary markets. One should keep in mind
that HIE becomes impossible without these complementary competencies and inputs.
Focusing solely on entrepreneurship abstracts from other factors necessary for an economy
to prosper. Still, entrepreneurship is crucial; a lack of entrepreneurs cannot be fully offset by
an ample supply of skilled labor or an extensive capital market.
2 Competence blocs and high-impact entrepreneurship
Economic growth is a complex process involving the creation and use of knowledge. We
draw on the theory of competence blocs (Eliasson and Eliasson 1996) to identify key actors
with different but complementary competencies that interact to generate, identify, select,
1 See Acs (2008) for an in-depth discussion of HIE. Acs claims that HIE should be an activity focused on
(homogeneous) mass production within the product market sector. However, we find it unnecessary to restrict
the concept of HIE to specific business activities and/or strategies.
2 This does not preclude the prospect of an entrepreneurial venture being sold to an incumbent fairly quickly.
The full potential of a business idea will more likely be realized if it is sold to an established business with
the requisite know-how and financial strength (Norbäck and Persson 2009).
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expand and exploit new ideas about how to satisfy consumer preferences more efficiently.3
This theory identifies at least seven types of actors crucial to generating long-run economic
growth:
i) Entrepreneurs identify new ideas and introduce those with expected profitability into
the market. An entrepreneur will pursue those entrepreneurial activities that are thought
to generate the largest private return. A highly profitable venture for the individual
entrepreneur may, however, have a zero or negative social rate of return. Productive
entrepreneurs perform entrepreneurial activities in which the social outcome is positive
and based on wealth generation (Baumol 1990). These entrepreneurs may be
characterized as agents of change (cf. Schumpeter 1934) and fulfill a fundamental
coordinating and judgmental function (see Peneder 2009 for an extensive discussion of
the concept of entrepreneurship).
ii) Inventors solve specific technical, organizational or economic problems. Inventors
have detailed knowledge about production processes, product specifications and so
forth that entrepreneurs may lack. Their work provides the basis for subsequent activity
by entrepreneurs who have a common understanding of the business idea and
commercialization process.
iii) Industrialists organize the commercialization of the original ideas into a large-scale
business after the introductory entrepreneurial phase. The introduction of new ideas
into the economy and the subsequent development of the original innovations into
large-scale businesses generally require two separate competencies (Flamholtz 1986;
Baumol 2004). Sometimes the original entrepreneur evolves into an industrialist and
continues to head his/her firm as it becomes larger, but more often than not, the
entrepreneur will cede the top executive position to somebody with the requisite
experience and competence to manage a large firm. The industrialist may also be a
competitor to the entrepreneur who introduced the original innovation.
iv) Skilled labor. Economic development and growth requires labor with relevant
professional skills. Rapidly expanding industries are often hampered by a lack of
individuals with specific skills.
v) Venture capitalists supply equity capital to enterprises in the early phases of business
ventures.4 They also identify entrepreneurs and projects, assess the value of potential
investments, supervise management and evaluate investments. In the case of sustained
mismanagement of a company, or if it can be more skillfully managed by somebody
else, venture capitalists can enforce, change and appoint new management better
equipped to lead the company. In addition to providing capital, venture capitalists
supply management skills, industry-specific knowledge and access to business
networks. Many entrepreneurial firms are too small for venture capital funding. Yet
venture capital retains importance for high-performing and high-growth entrepreneurial
firms (OECD 1998).5
3 See Johansson (2010) for an introduction. The idea of the importance of complementary competencies to
generate growth is recognized by a number of research scholars. See, e.g., Phelps (2007, p. 553) for a
discussion in conformity with our analysis.
4 So-called business angels carry out a similar function as venture capitalists, generally in earlier phases.
Business angels are not explicitly mentioned in the original definition of the competence bloc.
5 Gompers and Lerner (2001) provide a comprehensive analysis of the importance of venture capital for
innovation and firm growth. Kedrosky (2009) shows that approximately 16% of the fastest-growing private
companies on the Inc. 500 list in the United States had VC backing.
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vi) Actors in secondary (exit) markets have similar competencies and carry out similar
functions as venture capitalists, but do so at a later stage when entrepreneurs and
venture capitalists want to exit from their investments. There are several types of
actors in secondary markets, most notably portfolio investors in publicly listed
companies, private equity (PE) firms, and management buy-ins (see Wright 2007 for
an overview of the different categories, and Prowse 1998 and Norbäck et al. 2010 for
analyses of the function of the private equity market).
vii) Competent customers provide the entrepreneur with information about consumer
preferences. The ability to discern these preferences, so that highly-valued goods and
services are produced, is a key ingredient in successful entrepreneurship. A competent
customer can be an individual or a firm. Cooperation with one or several large firms
that dominate an industry provides knowledge about a considerable share of the
market. Large enterprises rich in capital can also function as competent venture
capitalists and finance the development of particular products. An important case in
point is large firms that finance small firms developing new products that are then
commercialized by large firms (see, e.g., Lerner and Merges 1998 and Audretsch and
Feldman 2003).
The categories of actors can differ in a number of respects. For example, the competence
of an industrialist may be restricted to a particular industry or to firms of a certain size. In
addition, one individual can carry out more than one function, such as acting as both an
entrepreneur and an industrialist.6
Commercialization of innovations reveals large variations in economic performance.
There are good reasons to expect this state of affairs; economic potential differs across
innovations, firms and innovations are in different phases of development, and competence
blocs themselves are in different phases of development. Consequently, rapid growth
necessitates large flows of workers and other factors of production across firms due to
experimentation in the face of uncertain market prospects, cost structures, managerial
abilities and technologies (Jovanovic 1982).7
Figure 1 summarizes the competence bloc and the role of key actors in the process of
fostering HGFs. Some actors may be important in several phases, and a certain individual
can fulfill several functions either simultaneously or at different points in the individual’s or
firm’s life cycle. Even though most HGFs do not display sustained growth but rather follow
a more complex pattern (Parker et al. 2010), the development of rapidly growing firms may
be depicted in a stylized form as an S-curve.
The figure shows at which stage of a firm’s growth different actors play a key role. The
order in which the categories appear beneath the boxes indicates the actor with the main
coordinating responsibility. This is not a definite ranking; it differs across enterprises and
sectors in practice, but it still shows a stylized depiction of the typical situation. In the first
phase (the development of novel business ideas), entrepreneurs identify potential business
opportunities together with competent customers, while inventors are engaged to solve
6 The original definition included the category “innovators” whose function was an extension of that of
inventors. In short, they bridged the gap between inventors and entrepreneurs. This implies a more
administrative role in practice, managing the integration of inventions and technologies into well-functioning
worthwhile products. The definition differs from Schumpeter (1934), who uses “innovator” and
“entrepreneur” synonymously. We have noticed that this confuses many readers and have therefore decided
to leave out “innovators” from the analysis. Their function will be partially subsumed under the categories
skilled labor and entrepreneurs.
7 Eighty percent or more of the reallocation of workers takes place within narrowly defined sectors of the
economy in developed countries. See Caballero (2007, p. 19 ff) for an overview of the evidence.
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specific problems. The first phase of commercialization (introduction and early growth of
firms) involves entrepreneurs; skilled workers are only involved to a small extent.
Industrialists are active in the phase of industrialization and rapid growth, which also
requires a great deal of skilled labor. Venture capitalists are important financiers in the
earlier phases, although this role is taken over by actors in secondary markets in later
phases when the firm is larger. Competent customers are typically involved in all phases
and ultimately determine the demand for the good.
To sum up, rapid economic growth and employment creation occur if individual actors
form competitive competence blocs and establish new firms with high growth potential and
aspirations. This requires appropriate institutions that harmonize the incentives of the
different types of actors with complementary competencies (Pelikan 1993; Henrekson and
Johansson 2009). In the next two sections we will focus our analysis on two highly
important policy areas and describe how HIE and potential HGFs are affected by tax policy
and policies governing the labor market.
3 Tax policy and high-impact entrepreneurship
Working within the theory of competence blocs, we have identified seven distinct
categories of actors crucial for HIE and HGFs. However, the tax code does not
acknowledge these categories; there is no specific tax on income from entrepreneurial
effort, inventive activity or the return on acquired skills. Based on provisions in the tax
code, individual (personal) income is classified as labor income, business income or capital
income instead, and within each of these categories there may be further provisions that
influence the effective tax rate. Income from labor and income from business are normally
added up and called earned income. Besides these categories, the tax system normally
includes corporate taxation, tax on asset holdings and different forms of indirect taxation
such as payroll taxes and sales taxes/VAT. The incentive effects of the tax system are
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Fig. 1 The competence bloc and the fostering of HGFs
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In Table 1 we outline different kinds of taxation and list the most important aspects of each
category. We will discuss each type of tax in turn to examine how incentives for the different
categories of actors in the competence bloc are affected. To avoid excessive fragmentation of
the text, taxes with similar effects will be discussed together. However, the taxation of stock
options, which is formally not a distinct tax category, will be discussed separately. The total
tax effect of stock options may depend on more than one of the other tax categories and it
deserves specific attention. The total effect on key competencies, including risk-taking
behavior, is determined by the combined effect of the different taxes. We end this section by
summarizing the total effect of all different taxes and how this may affect key competencies.
3.1 Taxation of earned income and payroll taxes
The level and progressivity of labor taxation (including mandatory social security
contributions) always affect employees directly by determining the incentives for work
effort, labor supply (on the extensive and intensive margin), occupational choice, career
aspirations, and the propensity to upgrade and learn new skills. High and progressive labor
taxes lower the rate of return on productive skills, and are therefore likely to impair the
supply of skilled workers. They also slow restructuring and the reallocation of people
across firms, as it becomes more costly to obtain the net wage differential necessary to
induce a person to quit their current employment position.
When inventors are taxed as wage-earners or self-employed, their incentives are also
affected by the tax code for earned income. The same is true for industrialists, unless they
Table 1 Different types of taxes with an impact on the actors in the competence bloc
Taxation of earned income
and payroll taxes
Corporate taxation
–level and degree of progressivity
–level and degree of progressivity
–social security contributions
–statutory rate/effective rate
Taxation of capital income
–accounting measures to lower effective taxation
–level and degree of progressivity
–single—or multilevel taxation
–dividends vs. interest income
–degree of symmetry in the tax treatment of
business profits and losses:
–exemptions
–against other types of income
–differences across assets
–against future profits
–differences across types of owner
–effect of progressivity
–differences based on holding period
–treatment of holding companies
–differences across instruments
–domestic/foreign
–preferential treatment of pension savings Taxation of stock options
Taxation on asset holdings
–capital or labor income
–wealth tax
–tax on realized or imputed gain
–property tax
–differences based on holding period




For all types of taxes it matters whether nominal or real incomes are taxed
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have a large ownership share in the firm they manage, which is usually not the case for
large firms.
Taxing income from entrepreneurship as earned income also affects the entrepreneur’s
incentives. High taxes on earned income tend to encourage self-employment because the
self-employed can avoid reporting some of their income, convert part of their private
consumption expenditures into tax-deductible business costs, and shift more highly taxed
earned income to corporate or capital income taxed at a lower rate (Feldstein and Slemrod
1980). These mechanisms may affect who becomes self-employed (cf. Murphy et al. 1991),
but HIE has little in common with people who start their own ventures simply to avoid
paying higher taxes. Rather, taxing income from entrepreneurship as earned income
probably reduces opportunities for legitimate and productive entrepreneurship. The
possibility for a small company to avoid paying high taxes may also discourage growth
beyond a certain threshold, at which point it becomes more difficult to exploit these tax-
avoidance strategies.
In other words, high taxation on earned income may induce people to become self-
employed, but it could also weaken their incentives to develop HGFs. But this conclusion is
still too simplistic. As noted earlier, entrepreneurial income can appear in many other forms
from a tax perspective, including dividends, capital gains on equity and/or gains on stock
options, and interest income on lending by the entrepreneur to her/his own business. Given
the complexity of the tax code in a typical OECD country, the incentive effects of taxes on
earned income for entrepreneurs are quite multifaceted. However, a great deal of the
entrepreneurial function is carried out by employees without an ownership stake in the firm
who are always subject to the earned income tax schedule. For these categories, a high tax
on earned income has negative incentive effects.
Much empirical work has been done that analyzes the relationship between income taxes
and entrepreneurship (see Bruce and Schuetze 2004 for an overview). However, most of
these studies examine the level of self-employment, which is a rather crude proxy for
entrepreneurship and a poor proxy for HIE and HGF. From our point of view, the most
relevant studies are those carried out by Carroll et al. (2000, 2001), who analyze the U.S.
tax reform in 1986 and find that higher marginal income taxes impair business growth,
capital investment and the probability of hiring labor.
The level and progressivity of earned income taxation also indirectly affect the industry
structure from the demand side. A large percentage of all work, most notably household
work, is performed outside the market. Cross-country comparisons of industry-level
employment also point to considerable scope for substitution of certain economic activities
between the market and non-market sectors (Rogerson 2006; Freeman and Schettkat 2005).
High rates of personal income taxation (earned income) tend to make it more profitable
to shift a large share of service production to the informal economy, in particular into the
“do-it-yourself” sector (see Dew-Becker and Gordon 2008; Rogerson 2006 and Davis and
Henrekson 2005 for assessments of these effects across OECD-countries). As a result, the
emergence of a large, efficient service sector competing successfully with unpaid work is
less likely in countries with high rates of personal income taxation. Consequently, important
opportunities for commercial exploitation and entrepreneurial business development
become less accessible. When services are provided by professionals, incentives emerge
to invest in new knowledge, develop more effective tools, devise superior contractual
arrangements, and create more flexible organizational structures.
Thus, the tax burden on earned income steers consumer demand towards sophisticated
material goods and low-priced goods that complement one’s own time. In countries
where the taxation of earned income is high, competent customers are therefore more
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likely to be either firms or public entities that buy intermediate goods or individuals who
demand goods that are difficult to produce in the household or in the underground
economy (see, e.g., Davis and Henrekson 2005 and Freeman and Schettkat 2005 for
empirical evidence).
Payroll taxes are normally included in discussions of labor taxation. High payroll taxes
deter entrepreneurs from hiring (skilled) employees if wage costs are too high (if the
incidence of the payroll tax is on the employer/entrepreneur) or the net wage too low (if the
incidence of the payroll tax is on the employee), or a combination of these two effects (if
part of the incidence is on the employer and part on the employee). High payroll taxes
could also discourage development within the service sector in the same way as the earned
income tax, as discussed above.
3.2 Taxation of capital income
The taxation of capital income differs by country and over time, leading to tax systems
riddled with variations. To begin with, earned income and capital income can be taxed
according to the same tax schedule, or be taxed separately with different tax schedules. If
the two types of income are taxed together with a progressive income tax, very high taxes
on capital income may occur as a result. The same is true if the tax rate is applied to
nominal returns rather than real returns. If the incomes are taxed separately with a lower
capital income tax rate, the tax code may restrict capital gains and dividend payments to the
owners of closely held firms in order to prevent active owners from converting high taxed
labor income into low taxed capital income.
The taxation of capital income especially influences the incentives for entrepreneurs and
actors in secondary markets. A high tax rate on dividends encourages entrepreneurs to rely
on retained earnings to finance expansion. This punishes new ventures, locks in retained
earnings, and traps capital in incumbent firms. What’s more, taxing dividends at a high rate
favors projects in incumbent ventures, shrinking the flow of capital to the most promising
projects and diminishing possibilities of finding and financing new HGFs. If dividends
from closely held companies are taxed harder than other capital incomes as a way to reduce
the tax avoidance behavior discussed above, entrepreneurship will be discouraged even
further. Other tax systems may, however, treat categories of capital incomes differently.
They may tax dividends at a lower rate than interest income reflecting the fact that
dividends, in contrast to interest payments, are not tax-deductible business costs for the firm
and hence have already been taxed at the corporate level. This makes the tax system more
neutral between different owner categories.
Most of the economic return from the successful formation of an HGF or HIE comes,
however, in the form of a steeply increased market value of its stock rather than as
dividends or large interest payments to the owners (Spulber 2009). As a result, the taxation
of capital gains on stock holdings probably has a larger effect on the incentive to create
wealth through the fostering of HGFs and HIE. A tax system with zero or very low tax rates
on capital gains on long-term holdings of equity provides strong incentives for
entrepreneurs to create value by investing money and effort in their own business, and to
give other key actors (industrialists and business angels) ownership stakes in the firm if
their competencies are required. On the other hand, a tax system that puts restrictions on
capital gains in order to prevent owners of profitable small businesses from paying less tax
relative to how much they would pay as regular employees, penalizes owners of stock in
closely held firms relative to owners of stock in listed firms. This discourages
entrepreneurial initiatives and other key actors.
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High capital gains taxation also locks in capital, making key agents less willing to realize
capital gains (Auten and Cordes 1991; Daunfeldt et al. 2010). Experiments have shown that
taxing capital gains at a high rate may prevent investors from undertaking new investments
(Meade 1990), thereby impairing HIE and HGFs. In attempting to free up capital, high
capital gains taxation may also lead to excess debt financing, which increases risk and the
overall vulnerability of the economy. As many potential HIE projects fail, increased debt
financing also increases the likelihood that the failures’ negative repercussions will spread
throughout the economy. Hence, the tax system may encourage debt financing and excess
leverage in the economy, increasing systemic risk and making the country more vulnerable
to crisis.8
Moreover, the capital gains tax may differ across different types of owners, as some,
such as institutional investors and offshore trust funds, are taxed at lower rates than
individuals. This is likely to spur an endogenous response in the ownership structure of the
business sector towards the tax-favored owner categories. If individual stock holdings are
disfavored relative to institutional holdings and institutions are less willing to invest in
small and new entrepreneurial projects, HIE and HGFs will be hampered.9
The tax system may also provide forceful incentives regarding the level and channeling
of savings. Tax systems may differ as to whether deduction of interest payments is
permitted (in real or nominal terms), and savings in the form of life insurance are often tax
favored relative to other forms of savings. Insurance premiums may be tax deductible
against current wage income, and the yield may not be subject to taxation until it is paid
out. Normally, pension savings can neither be bought back by the policy holder nor become
available until a greater age. Returns on savings in mutual funds may also be taxed
differently than savings in individual securities, especially with regard to capital gains
taxation. In this form of taxation, a change in the asset composition made by the investment
fund has no tax consequences, while the same changes in the case of direct asset holdings
could result in the payment of capital gains tax.
A tax system that encourages reliance on savings schemes that escape capital taxation, as
discussed above, typically restricts the owner’s control of the assets. In this way, the tax
treatment of financial assets and property encourages the accumulation of illiquid assets
controlled by large financial institutions rather than assets under the direct control of the
owner. Such personal financial assets cannot be used by the asset holder as working capital
in an existing or new owner-operated business. This particularly affects entrepreneurs and
venture capitalists and, hence, the generation and early growth of HGFs and HIE.
3.3 Corporate taxation and risk-taking
A high tax rate on business profits discourages equity financing and spurs debt financing.
When debt financing is less costly and more readily available for larger firms, high
corporate tax rates coupled with tax-deductible interest payments put smaller firms and
potential HGFs at a disadvantage. Taxing corporate profits also reduces the amount of
8 See, e.g., IMF (2009), discussing the so-called “debt bias” caused by the current tax systems and how this
may have contributed to, though not triggered, the 2008–09 crisis. Berger and Udell (2003) also claim that
equity financing is preferred in cases where significant moral hazard may be present, such as in HGF and
high-risk (new) firms.
9 See, e.g., Rydqvist et al. (2009), who show how the tax system endogenously induces changes in the
ownership structure favoring institutional ownership. For a case study discussing the evolution in the UK, see
Bank and Cheffins (2008).
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retained earnings that can be used to expand an existing venture. Moreover, taxing
profits in small firms often leads to lower growth rates (Michaelas et al. 1999). Hence, it
is plausible that high corporate taxes hamper the prevalence of HGFs and HIE. As
discussed above, a tax system that favors debt financing will also increase the
vulnerability of the economy.
Statutory and effective corporate income tax rates diverge greatly due to tax-reducing
depreciation rules, inventory valuation rules, and other more ad hoc tax reductions specific
to either country or industry. Lowering the effective tax rate may foster unproductive tax
evasion or avoidance behavior among firms, distracting entrepreneurial activity from more
productive uses and dampening potential HGFs and HIE in the economy.
But the level of the corporate income tax may not be the only thing that matters—the
symmetry involved in the taxation of business profits and losses may also affect the level of
risk-taking, thereby influencing entrepreneurial activity and HIE and HGFs as well. It has
been argued that governments can provide insurance for business owners by taking (i.e.,
taxing) part of their profits in good times to offset losses in bad times (Domar and
Musgrave 1944; Kaplow 1994). Such insurance could encourage the kind of risk-taking
that is central to all entrepreneurial activity, not least HGFs and HIEs.
Yet a number of arguments have been leveled against this proposition. For instance, if
the income tax rate is progressive and taxes successful projects at a relatively higher rate,
and if the tax system does not offer full loss offset, the tax system may punish
entrepreneurial risk-taking. It has been shown empirically that a progressive tax system
deters entrepreneurship (Gentry and Hubbard 2000).10
Gordon (1998) and Cullen and Gordon (2007) extensively analyze how the tax system
may influence entrepreneurial risk-taking behavior, taking into consideration all these
effects. The progression, the level and the difference between the personal and corporate
income tax system all interact, often making the total effect ambiguous. Gordon (1998)
concludes that the corporate income tax should be low relative the personal income tax to
encourage new entrants. In order to favor new high-risk entrepreneurial firms as opposed
to new firms in general, the corporate tax rate should decline with income and stay below
the personal income tax rate for high incomes. Cullen and Gordon (2007) maintain that a
cut in the personal income tax can reduce entrepreneurial risk-taking as it reduces the
value of potentially deductible business losses. A cut in the corporate income tax rate
may, on the other hand, stimulate business activity, though not necessarily risk taking
overall.
However, it could very well be the case that taxation works as a misdirected form of
insurance that only encourages new business ventures among those who are not
entrepreneurs (de Meza 2002). It is also crucial to distinguish between the quality and
quantity of entrepreneurship. Although higher taxes can theoretically stimulate entrepre-
neurship under some circumstances—empirical support for this conclusion can be found—
these results normally only refer to the quantity of entrepreneurship. However, HGF and
HIE are not mainly about quantity but about quality. A progressive tax system reduces the
option value of pursuing better projects for an entrepreneur. This may spur the number of
startups based on lower value business ideas, and hence increase the number of
entrepreneurs but decrease the quality of entrepreneurship (Asoni and Sanandaji 2009).
Hence, even if higher tax rates spur some types of entrepreneurship, higher taxes are likely
to be negative for HGF and HIE.
10 These results are not unambiguous, see, e.g., Yuengert (1995).
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3.4 Taxation of assets holdings
Several types of taxes levied on asset holdings decouple the tax payment from the return.
This holds true for taxes on wealth, property and inheritance. When these taxes are non-
zero, rules detailing how taxable wealth is assessed in the business sector become especially
important in our context. Successful entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and actors in
secondary markets have been shown to be highly sensitive to these kinds of taxes (see
Rosen 2005 for an overview).
Wealth tax based on corporate wealth and equity holdings stifles risk-taking in the
economy. Normally, income taxes are only levied on positive incomes; because losses are
deductible, income taxes can function as a form of risk-sharing, at least in theory. However,
this effect does not materialize when wealth is taxed. Net wealth taxation occurs
independently of revenue and profit. HGFs often demand large investments from key
actors. Even if these HGFs suffer large initial losses, the key actors must pay wealth tax on
the firm value (which could still be high due to potential future profits). A wealth tax raises
the downside risk in investments, doubtlessly reducing willingness to participate in risky
HGF projects (see, e.g., the discussion in Schnellenbach 2007).
A wealth tax also discourages potential entrepreneurs from accumulating wealth. This
poses a problem, as private wealth is often needed to start up and expand a new business;
key actors and banks are usually reluctant to supply capital because of asymmetric
information (see, e.g., Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994). Wealth tax could also induce capital flight,
which worsens prospects of finding available capital even more. Abolishing wealth taxes
together with wealth tax amnesty could lead to capital repatriation, making more capital
available for HGFs and HIE.
A wealth tax also stimulates unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship in the form
of tax evasion behavior. A wealth tax is normally very complex and includes many
anomalies and exceptions, making the potential gains from tax avoidance high.
Exempting corporate wealth and equity holdings from wealth taxation would spur
investment in entrepreneurial ventures by key actors. Alternatively, corporate wealth could
be taxed heavily, while other assets such as pension savings or works of art are exempted. If
financial assets are subject to wealth tax, pension savings are usually spared. This may
encourage the accumulation of illiquid assets controlled by large financial institutions,
which would in turn hamper HIE, as discussed above.
3.5 Sales taxes/VAT
The incidence of commodity taxation generally falls on final domestic consumers, while
intermediate goods and exports are exempted. Hence, the effects of these taxes on the actors of
the competence blocs are similar to the effects of income taxation concerning the emergence of
newmarkets, in particular the service sector. For instance, Piggott andWhalley (2001) find that
Canada’s 1990 switch from a sales tax on manufactured goods, which offers little scope for
production outside the legal market sector, to a broad-based consumption tax affected the
composition of consumption expenditures by inducing a large substitution away from the
legal market provision of food preparation and dining services. Likewise, Spiro (1993) reports
a sizeable increase in underground activity following this tax switch.
In some countries, certain commodities such as personal services and merit goods are
exempted or taxed at lower rates, while some goods (alcohol, energy, etc.) are taxed more
heavily. Generally, there are considerable differences in sales/VAT taxation across countries
and commodity groups.
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3.6 Taxation of stock options
Stock options can be used to encourage and reward individuals who supply key
competencies to a firm. As mentioned above, income from stock options is not defined
by its own tax rate. Despite the complicated taxation process, income from stock options
will in the end be taxed as either earned income or capital income at the personal level.
Still, the tax code surrounding stock options deserves specific attention because of its great
impact on HIE and HGFs. In ideal circumstances, stock options provide incentives that
closely mimic direct ownership. Employed inventors, entrepreneurs and industrialists
benefit most from such a scheme, especially when stock options are used to alleviate
agency problems.
The efficiency of stock options depends greatly on the tax code. If gains on stock
options are taxed as earned income when they are tied to employment in the firm, some of
the incentive effect is lost. This is particularly true if the gains are subject to (uncapped)
social security contributions and if the marginal income tax rate is high.
The situation changes dramatically if an employee who accepts stock options can defer
the tax liability to the time when the options or the stocks received are eventually sold. The
effectiveness is further reinforced if there are no tax consequences for the employee upon
the granting or exercise of the option, and if the employee is taxed at a low capital gains
rate when the stock acquired through the exercise of the option is sold. In the latter case, the
tax risk of the options is pushed back to the government. This accomplishes two things: it
increases the potential profit from the stock options and it allows budget-constrained
individuals to sell stocks whenever they choose to do so.11
3.7 Total effects
In order to fully evaluate the effect of the tax system on the incentives for HGFs and HIE, it
is necessary to account for the combined effects of all taxes. Estimating the real size of the
marginal tax burden faced by private firms for investment in real capital is a painstaking
task, requiring the consideration of effects such as corporate taxation with its specific rules
for depreciation and valuation, as well as the taxation of interest income, dividends, capital
gains, and wealth. In addition, we need to examine how these tax schedules differ across
different types of investors. A correct estimate of the tax burden must take into
consideration what type of real capital the firms invest in, how these investments are
financed, who the firm’s owners and creditors are, and in what industries the investments
are made. Estimates have been made for a number of countries using the methodology
developed by King and Fullerton (1984). Generally, these studies show large differences of
real rates of taxation depending on type of owner and sources of finance, which is likely to
have a large impact on incentives for the various actors in the competence bloc.
If taxation is nominal and tax rates are high, the real rate of taxation can easily exceed
100% even at moderate inflation rates. On the other hand, this can be largely offset by tax
deductions of interest payments, and if certain investments are tax favored, opportunities
for tax arbitrage arise (see, e.g., Fukao and Hanazaki 1987, who provide systematic
evidence of such effects for OECD countries in the 1970s and 1980s).
11 It is noteworthy that the U.S. changed the tax code in the early 1980s along these lines, paving the
way for a wave of entrepreneurial ventures in Silicon Valley and elsewhere (Misher 1984; Gompers
and Lerner 2001).
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Let us consider further the investment and supply decisions of economic actors,
including whether to acquire and utilize any of the key competencies crucial for HGFs. It is
clear from our analyses of the tax system that these choices depend on the complex
interplay of a number of tax rates and tax code provisions, and on the incentives for savings
in general, especially in forms amenable to equity financing.
Tax systems typically contain many asymmetries that give rise to distortions concerning
for instance ownership and firm age, which tend to have a negative effect on the
functioning of competence blocs and the ability to generate HGFs. There exist innumerable
combinations of tax rates and tax provisions, resulting in different blends of ownership
structure, financing structure, industry structure, size distribution of firms and employment
dynamics across countries.
Let us consider the venture capital (VC) industry as an example. As explained in
Section 2, venture capitalists (VC) often fulfill a crucial role in the development of a small
entrepreneurial high-growth venture by converting high-risk opportunities to a more
acceptable risk level through portfolio diversification, and by adding key competencies that
the firm may be lacking. This is achieved by means of developing arrangements that align
the incentives of the three actors—investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurial start-
ups (Zider 1998; Gompers and Lerner 2001). The extent to which this is possible is also
largely governed by the tax code for stock options and capital gains, and whether pension
funds are allowed to invest in high-risk securities issued by small or new companies and
venture capital funds.
The tax systems of many countries evolved before complicated ownership structures
involving VC/PE financing even existed.12 Sophisticated mechanisms have been needed to
provide high-powered incentives for a number of actors in addition to the final equity
holders. In fact, the modern VC industry in the United States could not have evolved until
the tax system was changed in key respects: new legislation in 1979 allowing pension funds
to invest in high-risk securities issued by small or new companies and venture capital funds,
sharp reductions in the capital gains tax, and stock option legislation of 1981 making it
possible to defer tax liability to when the stocks are sold rather than when the options are
exercised (Fenn et al. 1995).
Even seemingly neutral taxation may give rise to distortions if some actors and firms are
financially constrained, notably small firms. These examples include corporate taxation,
taxation on savings and taxation on private wealth; small, young firms rely on retained
earnings and private equity to a larger extent. Likewise, the regulatory tax burden is likely
to fall more heavily on small and young firms (and hence on potential HGFs), since
accompanying administrative costs have a large fixed component that is unrelated to the
size of the firm. This is recognized in a number of countries which identify the regulatory
burden itself as an impediment to economic development, in particular for young and small
firms (see, e.g., European Commission 2007).
Three conclusions can be drawn from our analysis of the effect of the tax system on
incentives for HIE and HGFs:
(i) The tax system is likely to have far-reaching effects.
(ii) In order to identify the incentive effects for the key actors in the competence bloc, the
tax code has to be examined at a detailed level. Hence, cross-country studies that try
to explain differences in industry structure, size distribution of firms, prevalence of
12 VC and PE involves several layers of ownership: private ownership stake by founders and key personnel,
ownership share by VC/PE firm, ownership stake by VC/PE partners (often indirect), investor stake in the
VC/PE fund and final beneficiaries of institutions investing in VC/PE funds.
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HGFs and the like by using raw tax rates or other aggregate tax-system indicators as
regressors may be misleading.
(iii) A number of common features of tax systems lead to large distortions, disfavoring
infant HGFs and thereby the effectiveness of HIE.
4 Labor market policy and high-impact entrepreneurship
Job creation and destruction flows are large and persistent—10–15% of all jobs in the
private sector are destroyed each year (Davis and Haltiwanger 1999). The overwhelming
share of these job flows takes place within narrowly defined sectors of the economy.
According to a variety of studies, only about 10% of reallocation reflects shifts of
employment opportunities across 4-digit industries. Based on the existing empirical
literature, Caballero (2007, p. 24) maintains that more than 50% of aggregate productivity
growth emanates from reallocation across plants/firms in the same industry, and 20–50%
can be attributed to the effect of entry and exit in narrowly defined industries. Caballero
also shows that the gross flow of workers is higher in firms with high productivity growth.
Taken together, these observations point to the importance of experimentation and
selection.
Moreover, studies using matched employer–employee data reveal very large churning, or
hires and separations in excess of total job creation and destruction (Abowd and Kramarz
1999). In other words, worker flows are much larger than job flows, perhaps as much as
twice the volume.
Labor studies document massive ongoing restructuring of jobs and workers across firms.
It is reasonable to hypothesize that HGFs and potential HGFs are more in need of flexibility
and freedom of contracting in order to realize their high-growth potential. Institutions that
hamper the freedom of contracting curtail the possible combinations of factors of
production. The large productivity differentials across firms in the same industry indicate
that after controlling for skills/competencies, labor productivity can vary dramatically
depending on who is the manager/entrepreneur.
We will now examine the impact of labor market institutions on the functioning and
efficiency of the competence bloc. We focus on three labor market institutions of particular
importance for the economy’s ability to promote HIE and thus to generate HGFs:
(i) labor market regulations, especially concerning job security mandates;
(ii) wage-setting institutions; and
(iii) the social insurance system.
4.1 The regulation of labor markets
There are large cross-country differences in the extent of labor market regulations (OECD
1994, 2004; Venn 2009). The empirical findings about churning and restructuring give
reason to believe that strict employment security provisions and other regulations that
restrict contracting flexibility are more harmful for enterprises that would like to grow
rapidly than for mature firms and firms without growth aspirations. As an employer learns
about a worker’s abilities over time, or as those abilities evolve with the accumulation of
experience, the optimal assignment of the worker to various tasks is likely to change. The
scope for task reassignment within the firm can be expected to rise with firm size. In an
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unfettered labor market, optimal task reassignment often involves mobility between firms,
and such mobility is more likely when the initial employment relationship involves a small,
often young, business.
Strong regulation of the employment and dismissal of employees keeps entrepreneurs
from adjusting their workforce in correspondence with market fluctuations, thereby
increasing risk in potential HIE and HGFs (Audretsch et al. 2002, p. 47). Moreover, both
the rate at which workers separate from jobs and the rate at which employers destroy job
positions decline with the size, age and capital intensity of the employer (Davis and
Haltiwanger 1999; Bartelsman et al. 2004). Hence, a low level of labor market regulations
increases the flexibility of high-risk entrepreneurial companies, making the evolution of
new companies into HIE and HGFs more likely. Figure 2 illustrates this tradeoff by
depicting the relationship between the strictness of employment protection and the rate of
high-growth expectation early-stage entrepreneurship, i.e., new firms and firm owners with
a willingness and potential for high growth (Bosma and Levie 2010).13 The figure clearly
shows that stricter employment protection is associated with a lower share of this form of
entrepreneurship.14
Furthermore, the relative advantage of being an employee decreases with weak
employment protection legislation, making it more favorable to undertake entrepreneurial
projects as self-employed (van Stel et al. 2007). Generous, far-reaching labor protection
legislation increases an employee’s opportunity cost of changing employers or leaving a
secure salaried job to become self-employed. Given that initiatives resulting in HIE and
HGFs often require a change of workplace, far-reaching labor protection legislation should
be avoided.15
If regular employment is highly regulated, strong incentives arise to devise arrangements
to circumvent the regulations. In several European countries, new routines of flexibility
have emerged. The most important forms include increased self-employment, the
emergence of an underground economy in which the government refrains from enforcing
regulations, and increased reliance on temporary employment (see Skedinger 2010 for an
overview).
For the self-employed, compensation and working hours are totally unregulated and no
labor security is mandated.16 Román et al. (2009) find that transitions from paid
employment to “dependent” self-employment—when a former employee acts as a sub-
contractor to a previous employer—increases with stricter protection. The share of the
workforce on temporary contracts and employment in staffing service firms is also on the
rise virtually everywhere in Europe (Kahn 2010).17 Trevisan (2008) exploits the fact that
13 Permission to use this figure and data from the GEM 2009 Global Report has been kindly granted by the
copyright holders. Our thanks go to the authors, national teams, researchers, funding bodies and other
contributors who have made this possible.
14 Of course, the figure only shows a correlation between the two variables. For a multivariable regression
analysis producing the same result, see Bosma (2009). Another interesting result in that study is that
employment protection has no effect on entrepreneurs with low growth ambitions. This clearly shows how
the institutional setup can influence different forms of entrepreneurship in different ways.
15 Worker mobility seems to be an important factor spurring successful entrepreneurship and knowledge
spillover in highly innovative and rapidly growing areas such as Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1994).
16 This is probably one of the reasons why the empirical evidence on the relationship between the degree of
employment protection and the level of self-employment is mixed. See Skedinger (2010) and Parker (2009,
pp. 450–451) for a survey of empirical studies.
17 Here it is worth noting that the share of employment in temporary work agencies is higher in the U.S.
states with stricter employment protection legislation (Autor 2003).
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the level of employment protection is differentiated by firm size in Italy. She finds that
firms close to the threshold size (15 employees) are more likely to rely on temporary
employment when expanding. For obvious reasons, staff on temporary contracts are less
motivated to invest in firm-specific skills and commit as strongly to the firm as employees
on permanent contracts. Thus, it becomes less likely that the firm will be able to attract
workers who have or are inclined to develop highly valued skills.
Also, very small firms may be able to avoid unionization and the signing of collective
agreements, and therefore benefit from greater freedom of contracting. This room for
maneuvering would likely disappear once the firm size exceeds a certain threshold, thus
increasing the cost of expansion.18
This is yet another factor likely to hamper the entrepreneurial spirit and willingness to
grow among new and small enterprises. These evasive measures do little to help HGFs.
Instead, they tend to create a system in which a large share of economic activity occurs in
small firms lacking the ability or the ambition to become HGFs. Onerous regulation makes
it difficult and risky to build large companies. Thus, a certain entrepreneurial effort is less
likely to be(come) high-impact in this case.
4.2 Wage-setting institutions
Wage-setting institutions may impact the functioning of the competence bloc and the
conditions for potential HGFs through several channels. In particular, the wage
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Fig. 2 Strictness of labor protection and high-growth expectation early-stage entrepreneurship. Employment
protection refers to the 2004 OECD index (version 2), high-growth expectation early-stage entrepreneurship
is the average over the 2004–2009 period according to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM).
R2= 0.57. Source: Bosma and Levie (2010)
18 These opposing effects are also consistent with the findings of no relationship between the rate of self-
employment and the degree of regulation of labor markets in rich countries (Robson 2003; Torrini 2005).
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businesses at a disadvantage, particularly in services, i.e., the most likely potential HGFs
(see Henrekson and Johansson 2010). Wages are consistently higher at larger employers,
even after exhaustive efforts to control for observable worker characteristics and other job
attributes (Oi and Idson 1999).
Also, old firms pay higher wages on average than new firms; industries in the low-end
of the wage distribution are found in services, not in manufacturing.19 Centralized wage-
setting institutions disadvantage potential HGFs by implementing standard rate
compensation policies that closely tie wages to easily observed job and worker
characteristics such as occupation, education, experience and seniority.20 In developed
countries, employees’ general income level is also relatively high, which in turn makes
the opportunity cost of leaving salaried employment to start or work in new potential
HGFs high as well (Ho and Wong 2007).
Given the large intra-firm differences in productivity and productivity growth, wages set
in negotiations away from the workplace that do not take idiosyncratic factors into account
will impair the functioning of the competence bloc for HGFs. Intra-firm differences are
especially large in young and rapidly expanding industries and firms (Caballero 2007),
which further underlines the potential negative effect on HGFs and HIE.
4.3 Labor markets and the social insurance system
By providing insurance for unfavorable outcomes, an extensive and generous public social
insurance system can in principle encourage individuals to pursue entrepreneurial
endeavors. This is a valid theoretical point shown formally by Sinn (1996), but it is an
open question whether it is important empirically. To our knowledge, this hypothesis has
yet to be tested empirically. At first sight, it seems clear that a generous welfare system
should make it less costly to bear uncertainty as an entrepreneur or to move to a risky job in
an entrepreneurial firm. In labor markets where job security is closely linked to job tenure,
this may no longer hold; what matters is the opportunity cost, or how much an employee
has to give up in terms of income security if (s)he transfers to self-employment or a risky
job in an entrepreneurial firm. For a tenured employee with a low-risk employer, the
opportunity cost rises considerably in many OECD countries.
In many countries important benefits are tied to employment, such as health insurance in
the U.S., for example. Many workers and potential entrepreneurs get “trapped” in large
companies that provide generous health insurance for the employee and his/her family.
Decoupling health insurance from employment would increase labor flexibility and reduce
fears of loosing adequate health insurance and other important benefits that may be tied to
employment. In Denmark, generous welfare systems are combined with weak job security
mandates, sometimes called “flexicurity” (Andersen 2005).
Furthermore, the manner in which savings are channeled to various investment activities
influences the type of business organization that can obtain credit. Pension funds are less
likely to channel funds to entrepreneurs than business angels or venture capital firms.
Hence, the composition of national savings is not neutral in its impact on entrepreneurship
19 Garen (1985) and Kremer (1993) develop theoretical models that explain the systematic sorting of more
productive workers to larger employers as an efficiency-enhancing outcome in economies with
heterogeneous, imperfectly substitutable labor.
20 Freeman (1998), Blanchflower and Freeman (1992), and Blau and Kahn (1996) provide evidence that
unions and other centralized wage-setting institutions compress wages among observationally similar
workers by promoting standard rate compensation policies.
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and small business development. If the government forces individuals to keep a large part
of their savings in a national pension fund system, small business credit availability will
suffer relative to an alternative policy and institutional arrangements that allow for greater
choice by individuals regarding their savings and investments.
A final point concerns the design of the supplementary pension system. Supplementary
pension plans that are not fully actuarial and individualized contain elements of
redistribution and risk-sharing across individuals in a group, like white-collar workers in
a certain industry, for example. The pension benefit level may be disproportionately tied to
the wage level achieved towards the end of the professional career. To the extent that this is
true, the mobility of (older) workers across firms is greatly discouraged, as well as the
hiring of elderly unemployed.
4.4 Summary of the effects of labor market regulations
The degree of regulation and design of labor markets, wage-setting and social insurance
systems influences incentives for potential HGFs and existing HGFs by restricting the
freedom of contracting and thereby curtailing the possible combinations of factors of
production. The need for experimentation in order to find more efficient factor
combinations is likely to be large in new firms and industries, especially in current HGFs
or potential HGFs. As a result, less mileage will be obtained from a certain entrepreneurial
effort, ultimately making it less likely that the effort will become HIE when constrained by
strict labor market regulations.
The most important channel by which labor market institutions affect HGFs and HIE is
by hampering the supply of skilled workers to firms undergoing expansion and/or change.
Given the large worker flows required in a dynamic economy, it is harder to recruit workers
with the competencies needed. The opportunity cost of leaving a tenured position goes up
for the employees while the fixed cost of hiring increases as well when a bad recruitment
becomes more costly to reverse; there may be threshold effects that make firms hesitant to
expand beyond a certain size, and a great deal of entrepreneurial effort may need to be
expended on evasive rather than directly productive activities.
Table 2 Policies favoring high-impact entrepreneurship in the areas of taxation and labor markets
Personal tax on earned income and
marginal tax rate on earned income
Low
Personal tax on capital income Low
Tax on stock options Low
Degree of tax neutrality across owner categories High
Degree of neutrality across sources of finance High
Personal taxation of asset holdings and
taxation of wealth
No, or exemption for equity holdings
Corporate tax rate Low statutory rate, low effective rate,
and neutral across types of firms and industries
Symmetric tax treatment of profit and losses Yes
Labor security mandates Portability of tenure rights
Design of pension plans Fully actuarial
Wage-setting arrangements Decentralized and individualized
Government role in income insurance Provide flexicurity
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If temporary contracts are used systematically in order to circumvent regulations tied to
permanent employment, industries and business ideas that depend on high-skilled labor and
on-the-job learning are disadvantaged. Legal and institutional hurdles that prevent firms
from laying off workers who underperform discourage potential HGFs and HIE from
expanding. Depending on how labor markets are regulated and how these regulations
interact with the social insurance system, the opportunity cost of becoming self-employed
or starting a new business is affected. When social security benefits are closely tied to
tenured positions and the employee has tenure at a low-risk employer the opportunity cost
increases heavily.
5 Conclusion
The successful commercialization of an innovation requires a chain of agents that work
together in order to develop a high-impact firm. The high degree of complexity in
production combined with the specificity of human capital makes successful interaction
within the competence bloc difficult but also highly rewarding when successful.
Entrepreneurship is arguably the most important. Most potential high-growth firms (HGFs)
fail, but the few that succeed account for a substantial part of growth and development. In
this article we have examined how tax and labor market policies should be designed in
order to foster a favorable environment for high-impact entrepreneurship (HIE).
Bringing together the specialized, non-transferable competencies of different actors into
a well-functioning whole is invariably difficult, even with favorable institutions and public
policies. Favorable economic institutions are of particular importance for the emergence of
HGFs, both because of the sensitivity of competencies to good institutions and because of
the high social return in terms of growth and job creation.
The institutional framework set by public policy affects the prevalence and performance
of both productive entrepreneurship and high-impact entrepreneurship. The institutional
framework will also have different effects on HGFs compared to the majority of firms with
no growth ambitions.
Rapid firm growth is a complex process requiring a number of different but
complementary competencies, and it is clear that studies with a narrow focus on a single
aspect are likely to be misleading. Our analysis also emphasizes the complementary
character of institutions. Lower taxes on entrepreneurial activities may have less effect than
expected if high taxes on skilled labor give rise to bottlenecks in production or if key areas
remain closed for entrepreneurial exploitation.
Our analysis is confined to highly developed countries with basic institutions in place,
such as secure property rights and the rule of law. Applying the theory of competence blocs,
we have emphasized two bundles of institutions which are particularly important for the
generation and growth of HIE and HGFs: the tax system and the organization and
regulation of labor markets. Key agents interact in complex ways; details in the tax system
are likely to be of great importance for the incentives and the outcome of their activities.
Table 2 summarizes the results of our study and shows the policies that provide a favorable
environment nurturing competence blocs and high-impact entrepreneurship.
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